The Technological Mediation of Morality - A Post-Phenomenological Approach to Moral Subjectivity and Moral Objectivity by Verbeek, Peter-Paul
 1
The Technological Mediation of Morality 
A Post-Phenomenological Approach to Moral Subjectivity and Moral O bjectivity 
 
Peter–Paul  Verbeek, 
Uni versi ty of Twente, Dept. of Phil osophy, 
P.O. Box 217 
NL - 7500 AE Enschede 
The N etherl ands 
p. p. c.c.verbeek@utwente.nl  
 
 
Abstract 
This  paper analyzes the moral relevance of technological artifac ts  and its  possible role in 
ethical theory, by taking the postphenomenological approach that has developed around the 
wo rk of Don Ihde into the domain of ethics. By elaborating a postphenomenological analysis 
of the mediating role of ultrasound in moral decisions about abortion, the article argues that 
technologies  embody morality, and help to constitute moral subjectivity. This technological 
mediation of the moral subject is  subsequently addressed in terms  of M ichel Foucault’s  
ethical position, in which ethics is  about actively co–shaping one’s  moral subjec tivity. 
Integrating Foucauldian ethics  and postphenomenology, the artic le argues that the 
technological mediation of moral subjec tivity should be at the heart of an ethical approach 
that takes the moral dimensions of technology seriously. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
During the past decades, the philosophy of technology has been an important construc tion 
site for a new branch of phenomenology. Primarily inspired by the work of Don Ihde, 
phenomenological philosophy of technology broke away from its  one–dimensional opposition 
to science and technology as  second–order and alienating ways to relate to reality (c f. Ihde 
1990). By developing analyses of the s truc ture of the relations between humans and 
technologies , and by investigating the ac tual roles of technologies  in human experience and 
exis tence, phenomenology came to analyze technology as  a cons titutive part of the lifeworld 
ra ther than a threat to it. The new phenomenological approached that came into being has 
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been called “postphenomenological”, because of its  opposition to some aspec ts  of “classical” 
phenomenology, as I will elaborate below. 
     In this  article, I will explore the illuminating power of the postphenomenological 
approach by taking it into the realm of e thics . Ethics and phenomenology have always had 
only loose connections. Yet, the postphenomenological analysis  of the technological 
mediation of human praxis  and experience makes phenomenology immediately relevant for 
ethics . An analysis  of the mediating role of obs tetric  ultrasound in the relations between 
expecting parents  and unborn child will show that technologies help to shape practices and 
interpretations of reality which form the basis  of moral decisions.  
     This  conclusion urges us to rethink both the s tatus  of the objec t and the s tatus  of the 
subject in ethical theory. Within the predominant ethical frameworks  it is  not only difficult to 
assign moral agency to inanimate objec ts , but also to consider behavior resulting from 
technological mediation as  “moral actions .” Such actions are not the product of deliberate 
and free decisions, after all, but induced by external fac tors . An analysis  of the late work of 
Foucault will serve as  a s tarting point to develop a notion of the moral subject that 
incorporates  the mediated character of subjec tivity. Foucault’s  investigations of moral 
subject constitution will appear to go well with the postphenomenological analysis  of the 
technological mediation of subjectivity. 
 
 
2. Phenomenology and Ethics 
 
2.1 From Phenomenology to Postphenomenology 
Postphenomenology aims to revive the phenomenological tradition in a way that overcomes 
the problems of classical phenomenology. These problems mainly concern what Ihde calls  
its  “foundational” charac ter (Ihde 1998, 113–126). Classical phenomenology explicitly 
defined itself as  an alternative to science. As  opposed to the scientific  goal to analyze 
reality, phenomenology aimed to describe it (Merleau–Ponty 1962, viii–x). This  claim to 
provide a “more authentic ” way of accessing reality has become highly problematic  in the 
light of developments  in 20th century philosophy, which have shown the mediated charac ter 
and contextuality of such claims. 
     As  I explained elsewhere (Verbeek 2005, 106–108), the fact that c lassical 
phenomenology failed to take the locality and context dependence of human knowledge into 
account is  unders tandable when the context in which it developed is  taken into account. 
Phenomenology presented itself as  a philosophical method that sought to describe “reality 
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itself,” s ince it opposed itself to the absolutization of the positivis tic  view of the world arising 
from modern natural science, which claims to describe reality as  it ac tually is . But the way 
in which phenomenology proceeded to develop its  alternative to science, did not in fac t 
result in a competing way of describing reality, but rather in an analysis  of the relations  
between humans and reality. Maurice Merleau–Ponty analyzed this  relation primarily in 
terms of perception, Edmund Husserl in terms of human consciousness, and Martin 
Heidegger in terms  of being–in–the–world. It is , therefore, more in accordance with the 
actual his tory of phenomenology to see phenomenology as  a philosophical movement that 
seeks to analyze the relations  between human beings and their world rather than to be a 
method for describing reality. 
     Redefining phenomenology along these lines, Ihde developed a “nonfoundational” 
phenomenological approach which he calls  “postphenomenological”. For Ihde, human–world 
relations need to be understood in terms of “intentionality ”, the direc tness  of human beings 
toward their world. Ihde shows that this  intentionality relation is  mos t often technologically 
mediated. Virtually all human perceptions and actions  are mediated by technological 
devices, ranging from eyeglasses and television sets  to cell phones and automobiles . These 
technological mediations do not so much take us to “the things themselves ” that classical 
phenomenology was longing for, but rather help to construct what is  real to us. Many 
mediated perceptions, after all, do not have a counterpart in everyday reality. 
Radiotelescopes, for ins tance, detect fo rms of radiation which are invisible to the human eye 
and which need to be “translated” by the device before as tronomers  can perceive and 
interpret it. There is  no “original” perception here which is  mediated by a device; the 
mediated perception itself is  the “original”. Phenomenological investigations  of this  type of 
mediation cannot possible aim to return to “the things themselves ”, but rather aim to clarify 
the s truc ture of technological mediation and its  hermeneutic  implications. 
     In my book What Things Do , I expanded Ihde’s definition of postphenomenology, by 
elaborating how human–world relationships  should not be seen as relations between pre–
exis ting subjects  who perceive and act upon a world of objec ts , but rather as sites  where 
both the objectivity of the world and the subjec tivity of those who are experiencing it and 
exis ting in it are constituted. What the world “is” and what subjec ts  “are ”, arises from the 
interplay between humans and reality; the world humans experience is “interpreted reality”, 
and human exis tence is “situated subjec tivity”. Pos tphenomenology, then, consis ts  in the 
philosophical analysis of human–world relations–including its  technologically mediated 
character–and of the constitution of subjectivity and objec tivity within these relations. It 
does not close the gap between subject and object by s tressing that subjec t and object are 
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always linked via the bridge of intentionality, but by claiming that they cons titu te each 
other. In the mutual relation between humans and reality, a specific  “objec tivity” of the 
wo rld arises , as  well as  a specific  “subjectivity” of human beings. 
 
2.2 Phenomenology and Ethics   
Its  focus on the mediating role of technology in the constitution of subjectivity and 
objec tivity makes postphenomenology directly relevant to ethics. After all, the 
postphenomenological approach makes it possible to inves tigate how technologies help to 
shape human perceptions and interpretations of reality on the basis of which moral 
decisions are made. A good example to illus trate this , as  I will elaborate more extensively 
below, is  obs tetric  ultrasound. This  technology is not simply a func tional means to make 
visible an unborn child in the womb. It ac tively helps  to shape the way the unborn child is  
given in human experience, and in doing so it informs the choices  his  or her expecting 
parents  make. Because of the ways in which ultrasound mediates  the relations between 
fetus  and future  parents , it constitutes  both in specific  ways, and therefore it plays a c rucial 
role in moral decision–making. 
     This  conclusion is  at odds with the p redominantly modernis t unders tanding of the 
relations between subjects  and objec ts , in which subjects  are ac tive and intentional, and 
objec ts  passive and mute. Postphenomenology moves beyond this  modernis t framework by 
showing that human intentionalities  can not only be operative “through” embodied 
technologies , but that in many cases “intentionality” needs to be located in human–
technology associations–and therefore partly in artifacts  as  well–without being able to 
entirely reduce the resulting intentionality to what was explicitly delegated to them by their 
designers  or users . Moreover, the postphenomenological approach shows that we cannot 
hold on to the autonomy of the human subjec t as a prerequisite fo r moral agency, but that 
we need to replace the “prime mover” s tatus  of the human subject with technologically 
mediated intentions. In our technological culture, humans and technologies  do not have a 
separate exis tence anymore, but help to shape each other in myriad ways . 
     Accepting the exis tence of something like technologically mediated morality does not 
easily fit our conceptual frameworks . As  Aaron Smith elaborated, the lack of a human prime 
mover makes it difficult to attribute responsibility for the actions that occur (Smith 2003). 
But rather than following his conclusion that “when we look to very complicated situations 
the human prime mover is  concealed and difficult to find, but it is  always there ” (Smith 
2003, 193), I would like to contend that hanging onto the prime mover s tatus  of human 
beings fails  to take the moral importance of technology seriously. As  the ultrasound case 
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will show, moral intentions come about on the basis  of technological mediations of the 
relations between humans and reality, and are always properties  of human–technology 
associations rather than of “prime movers ”. Adequate moral reflec tion about technology 
requires  us  to broaden the perspective of e thical theory and the ethics  of technology. 
 
 
3. A Postphenomenology of Ultrasound 
 
By elaborating a concrete case, the ethical relevance of the postphenomenological 
perspective can become more clearly visible. The case I will elaborate here is  obstetric  
ultrasound. I will analyze in what respects  the roles  played by this  technology transcend the 
mere functionality of making visible an unborn child in the womb. Ultrasound might seem a 
ra ther innocent medical technology. Expec ting couples  generally like to have a sonogram 
made, because it is  an exciting form of contact with the unborn child in the body of its  
mother. But even though it might be a “non–invasive” technology in a physical sense, 
ultrasound is  far from non–invasive in a moral sense. 
     In the Dutch situation, pregnant couples  are offered two routine ultrasound scans, one 
between the 10th and 12th week of pregnancy, and a second one at 20 weeks. The aim of 
the firs t scan is  to determine the age of the fetus–and the term of pregnancy–but also to 
calculate the risk that the child will suffer from Down’s  syndrome. This  risk is  calculated on 
the basis of measuring nuchal translucency, which indicates the thickness of the nape in the 
neck of the fe tus, mos t often in combination with a blood tes t. The aim of the second scan is 
to carefully examine the whole body of the unborn child in order to detect possible defects . 
This  examination is  done at 20 weeks, because at this  time it can reveal more defec ts  than 
the earlier scan, and because abortion in the Netherlands is  legal–under specific conditions–
until the 24th week. The examination can reveal a variety of defects , ranging from specific  
heart conditions to a harelip. 
     Postphenomenologically speaking, ultrasound constitutes  the unborn in a very specific  
way: it helps  to shape how the unborn can be perceptually present, and how it can be 
interpreted on the basis  of the specific  ways it is (re )presented. In Don Ihde’s  terms, a 
sonogram establishes a hermeneutic  relation between the unborn and the people watching 
it. In hermeneutic  relations , technologies  produce a representation of reality, which needs 
to be interpreted by its  “readers ”. Moreover, the technology itself embodies  a “material 
interpretation” of reality, because it has to make a “translation” of what it “perceives ” into a 
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specific  representation–in this  case, the scanner has to make a relevant translation of 
re flec ted ultrasonic  sound waves into a pic ture on a sc reen.  
     This  implies  that a sonogram does not provide a neutral “window to the womb”–as a 
well–known pro–life movie is  called, which makes intensive use of ultrasound imaging (c f. 
Boucher 2004)–but actively mediates how the unborn is  given in human experience. The 
specific  mediation brought about by ultrasound imaging has  a number of characteris tics . 
Some of these are directly related to how the unborn is  represented on the screen; others  
have to do with the specific  organization of obtaining this  visual contact with the unborn and 
the context agains t which the unborn can be made present. In all cases, the unborn is  
constituted in a specific  way and so are its  parents  in their relation to it.  
 
3.1 The Fetus as  a Person 
Firs t of all, the image on the screen has a specific size, and even though the representation 
on the sc reen sugges ts  a high degree of realism, the size of the fe tus  on the sc reen does 
not coincide with the size of the unborn in the womb. A fe tus  of 11 weeks old measures 
about 8,5 cm and weighs 30 grams, but its  representation on the sc reen makes it appear to 
have the size of a newborn baby (c f. Boucher 2004, 12). Moreover, a number of techniques 
are available to construct a realis tic  image of the unborn. In addition to this , a sonogram 
depic ts  the unborn independently from the body of its  mother. As  Maragete Sandelowski put 
it: “The fetal sonogram depic ts  the fetus  as  if it we re floating free in space: as  if it were 
already delivered from or outside its  mother’s  body” (Sandelowski 1994, 240). Ultrasound 
isolates  the unborn from its  mother.  
     All of these technological mediations generate a new ontological s tatus  of the fe tus . 
Ultrasound imaging constitutes  the fe tus  as an individual person; it is  made present as  a 
separate living being, ra ther than forming a unity with its  mother, in whose body it is  
growing. As such, obs tetric  ultrasound contributes to the coming about of what has been 
called “fe tal personhood”: the unborn is  inc reasingly approached as  a person (M itchell 2001, 
118; Boucher 2004, 13), o r even as  a “baby” which s till needs to be born (Sandelowski 
1994, 231; Zechmeis ter 2001, 393–395). This  experience of fe tal personhood is  enhanced 
by the possibility to see the gender of the unborn: by its  ability to reveal the genitals  
ultrasound genders  the unborn. The expec ting parents , as  a result, can already call the 
unborn by its  name. It is  not surprising, then, that a print of the firs t sonogram is  often 
included in the baby album as “baby’s firs t pic ture”–as  expressed in the title of Lisa 
Mitchell’s  book on obstetric  ultrasound (M itchell 2001). 
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3.2 The Fetus as  a Patient 
Ultrasound does not only constitute the fe tus  as  a person, but also as  a patient. An 
important goal of ultrasound sc reening is  to detect abnormalities . In an early s tage of 
pregnancy, ultrasound can be used for determining the risk of Down’s  syndrome; in a later 
stage it can be used to detect a variety of defects . For these purposes, ultrasound scanners  
are equipped with sophis ticated software which helps obs tetric ians to quantify the body of 
the unborn in various ways . These measurements  help to determine the term of pregnancy, 
but also the risk of specific  diseases. Ultrasound imaging lets  the unborn be present in 
terms of medical variables , and in terms of the risks  to suffer from specific  diseases (c f. 
Landsman 1998). 
     In translating the unborn to a possible patient, ultrasound makes pregnancy into a 
medical process  which needs to be monitored and which requires  professional health care. 
Moreover, ultrasound trans lates  “congenital defects ” into preventable forms  of suffering. As  
a result, p regnancy becomes a process  of choice: the choice to have tes ts  like neck fold 
measurements  done at all, and the choice what to do if anything is  “wrong”. The detection 
of a defec t with the help of ultrasound translates “expec ting a child ” into “choosing a child”–
or choosing to te rminate the pregnancy.  
     In fac t, the very possibility to have sonograms made at all, and therefore to detect 
congenital defects  before birth, irreversibly changes the character of what used to be called 
“expecting a child”. It inevitably becomes a matte r of choice now: also the choice not to 
have an ultrasound scan made is  a choice, even a very deliberate one in a society in which 
the norm is  to have these scans made–from the predominant idea that not scanning fo r 
diseases is  irresponsible, because then you then deliberately run the risk to have a disabled 
or s ick child, causing suffering both for the child and for the expecting parents  and their 
families . 
 
3.3 Relations Between Unborn and Parents  
This  isolation of the unborn from its  mother c reates  a new relation between both. On the 
one hand, the mother is  now deprived from her special relation to the unborn (Sandelowski 
1994, 231), shifting the privilege of having knowledge about the unborn to health care 
professionals  (Sandelowski 1994, 239). But on the other hand, these detaching effec ts  have 
their counterpart in an inc reased bonding between mother, father and unborn. Ultrasound 
can give expec ting parents  assurance of the baby’s health and the feeling of being closer 
and more attached to the unborn (Zechmeister 2001, 389). This  visual nearness to the 
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unborn is  also used in pro–life campaigns using ultrasound images to support their claim 
that abortion comes down to murdering a vulnerable person (Boucher 2004). 
     Another effec t of this  separation of mother and unborn is  that the mother is  inc reasingly 
seen as  the environment in which the unborn is  living, rather than forming a unity with it. 
And while the fetus  is  constituted as  a vulnerable subject, its  environment is  potentially 
harmful. This  opens the way for using ultrasound sc reening as  a form of surveillance, 
monitoring the lifestyle and habits  of expecting women in order to enhance the safety of the 
unborn. Rather than an intimate place to grow, the womb now becomes a potentially hostile 
environment which needs to be guarded (Oaks, 2000; Stormer 2000). The role of fathers  in 
pregnancy is  often enhanced by ultrasound, though. Fathers  appear to feel more involved 
because of the new visual contact with their unborn. And because of the medical s tatus  of 
having a sonogram made, fathers  are more easily allowed to take a few hours  off to attend 
the examination–while accompanying their partners  to the regular midwife visits  usually is  a 
bigger problem to employers  (Sandelowski 1994). 
     The most important mediating role of ultrasound imaging, however, is  that it constitutes  
expecting parents  as  decision–makers  regarding the life of their unborn child. To be sure, 
the role of ultrasound is  ambivalent here: on the one hand it may encourage abortion, 
making it possible to prevent suffering; on the other hand it may discourage abortion, 
enhancing emotional bonds between parents  and the unborn by visualizing “fetal 
personhood”. But nevertheless , ultrasound places expecting parents  in the position to make 
a decision about the lives  of their unborn child. By constituting both the unborn, the father 
and the mother in very specific  ways, it helps  to organize a new relation between the three. 
What appears  to be an innocent look into the womb, can end up being a firs t s tep in a 
decision–making process for which many expec ting couples  did not explicitly choose.  
     The impact of ultrasound imaging on moral decision–making regarding abortion is  not 
jus t an interesting theoretical hypothesis–the use of obstetric  ultrasound has important 
effec ts  on the p rac tice of antenatal diagnostics and abortion. Nuchal fold measurement, for 
ins tance–also in its  usual combination with a blood test–does not p rovide certainty about 
the health condition of the unborn, but only gives an indication of the risk that the unborn 
will suffer from Down’s  syndrome. In order to get certainty, an amniocentesis  needs to be 
done, which is  an invasive examination giving a risk of about 1:250 to have a miscarriage. 
Implicitly, for many parents , the desire to exclude the risk of having a child with Down’s  
syndrome appears  to be more important than the risk to lose a healthy unborn child. 
Moreover, the 20–weeks ultrasound examination offered in the Netherlands  to all pregnant 
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women appears  to inc rease the number of abortions of fe tuses with less  severe defects  like 
a harelip (Dutch national newspaper Trouw, 11 December 2006). 
     It appears  to be hard to escape the technological constitution as  subjects  that have to 
make a decision about the life of their unborn child. Even when people deliberately choose 
to use the 11 weeks ultrasound examination only to determine the expected date of birth, 
the mere possibility that the radiologis t might see the thickness of the nuchal fold will make 
it difficult not to try and interpret the expression of the face of the p rac titioner. Ultrasound 
inevitably and radically changes the experience of being pregnant and the interpretations of 
unborn life.  
 
3.4 Ethical Implications  
This  pos tphenomenological analysis  of the constitutive role of ultrasound imaging in the 
relations between parents  and unborn child has important implications for e thical theory. 
Not only does it give occasion to raise the ques tion if some form of moral agency needs to 
be asc ribed to devices  like ultrasound scanners , since they appear to actively help to answer 
our moral questions . It also draws attention to an interes ting connection between 
postphenomenology and ethics : the constitution of the moral subjec t. Here, 
postphenomenology touches the work of M ichel Foucault. Foucault’s  e thical work, as  laid 
down in parts  2 and 3 of his  His tory of Sexuality and published just before his  death, 
focuses on unders tanding the moral subjec t and its  role in ethics  (Foucault 1984a, 1984b). 
Foucault did not take the moral subjec t as  given, but as  precisely what is  at s take in ethics . 
Ethics  is  done by “subjecting” oneself to a specific  ethical code, and by doing so people 
constitute themselves as  specific  moral subjects. For Foucault, e thics  consis ts  in making this 
subject constitution explicit and asking ourselves the ques tion what moral subjec ts  we want 
to be. Postphenomenology adds a new dimension to this  cons titution of the moral subjec t: 
its  technologically mediated charac ter. In what follows I will fi rs t elaborate on the question 
to what extent technologies  can be said to ‘have’ morality. After that, I will explore this  
intersec tion between postphenomenology and Foucault’s  work, in order to elaborate an 
ethical perspective of technology which addresses the technological mediation of the 
constitution of moral subjectivity. 
 
4. Do artifacts have morality?1 
The question of the moral significance of technological artifac ts  has been playing a role on 
the backbenches  of the philosophy of technology fo r quite  some time now. As  early  as  1986 
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Langdon Winner asked himself: “Do artifac ts  have politics?” This  question was g rounded in 
his  analysis  of a  number of ‘racis t’ overpasses  in New York, which were deliberately built so 
low that only  cars  could pass  beneath them, but not buses, thus  p reventing the dark-
skinned population, unable to afford a car, from accessing the beach (Winner, 1986). Bruno 
Latour (1992) subsequently  argued that artifac ts  are bearers  of morality  as  they cons tantly 
help people to take all kinds  of moral decisions. For example, he shows  that the moral 
decision of how fas t one drives  is  often delegated to a speed bump in the road with the 
sc ript ‘slow down before reaching me’. Anyone complaining about deteriorating morality, 
according to Latour, should use their eyes  better, as  the objects  around us  are c rammed 
with morality.2 
Many of our ac tions and inte rpretations  of the world are co-shaped by the 
technologies  we use. Telephones mediate the way we communicate with others , cars  help to 
determine the acceptable dis tance from home to work, thermometers  co-shape our 
experience of health and disease, and antenatal diagnostic  technologies  generate difficult 
questions  regarding pregnancy and abortion, as  the previous section of this  paper shows. 
This  mediating role of technologies  also pertains to actions and decisions we usually call 
‘moral’, ranging from the driving speed we find morally acceptable to our decisions about 
unborn life. If e thics  is  about the question ‘how to ac t’, and technologies help to answer this  
question, technologies  appear to do ethics, or at least to help us  to do so. Analogously to 
Winner’s  claim that artifac ts  have politics , therefore, the conclusion seems justified that 
artifac ts  have morality: technologies  play an active role in moral ac tion and decision-
making. 
How can we unders tand this  material morality? Does it actually imply that artifac ts  
can be considered moral agents? In ethical theory , to qualify as a moral agent at least 
requires  the possession of intentionality and some degree of freedom. In order to be held 
morally accountable for an action, an agent needs to have the intention to ac t in a specific  
way, and the freedom to realize this  intention. Both requirements  seem problematic  with 
respect to artifacts , at least, at firs t s ight. Artifacts , after all, do not seem to be able to form 
intentions, and neither do they possess any form of autonomy. Yet, both requirements  for 
moral agency deserve further analysis. 
 
4.1 Technological intentionality  
At a firs t glance, it might seem absurd to speak about artifacts  in te rms  of intentionality. A 
closer inspection of what we  mean by ‘intentionality’ in relation to what artifacts  ac tually 
‘do’, however, makes  it possible  to attribute  a specific  form of intentionality  to artifac ts . To 
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show this , it is  important to make a dis tinction here between two aspec ts  of ‘intentionality.’ 
One, intentionality  entails  the ability  to  form intentions , and two, this  forming of intentions 
can be considered something o riginal or spontaneous  in the sense that it lite rally  ‘springs 
from’ or is  ‘originated by’ the agent possessing intentionality. Both aspec ts  of intentionality 
will appear not to be as alien to technological artifac ts  as at firs t they might seem. 
Firs t, the ‘mediation approach’ to technology, already mentioned above, makes it 
possible to attribute to artifacts  the ability to form intentions . In this  approach, technologies 
are analyzed in terms of their mediating roles  in relations  between humans and reality. The 
core idea is  that technologies , when used, always establish a relation between users  and 
their environment. Technologies  enable us to perform ac tions and have experiences that 
we re scarcely possible before, and in doing so, they also help us  to shape how we ac t and 
experience things. Technologies  are not neutral ins truments  or intermediaries , but ac tive 
mediators  that help shape the relation between people and reality. This  mediation has two 
directions : one pragmatic , concerning ac tion, and the other hermeneutic , concerning 
interpretation.  
Latour’s  work offers  many examples  of the pragmatic  dimension of technological 
mediation. With Madeleine Akrich, he coined the term ‘sc ript’ to indicate that artifacts  can 
presc ribe specific  actions , just like the sc ript of a film or play which prescribes who does 
what and when (Latour, 1992; Akrich, 1992). The speed bump mentioned above, for 
ins tance, embodies the sc ript ‘slow down before reaching me’. Everyday life is  loaded with 
examples  of technologies  that help to shape our ac tions. In Dutch supermarkets , shopping 
carts  are equipped with a coin lock, to encourage users  to put the cart back in place rather 
than leaving it at the parking lot. Recently, carts have been introduced with a wheel lock 
blocking the wheels  when the cart is  moved outside a designated area, thus preventing it 
from being s tolen.  
Don Ihde’s  work, as  elaborated above, concerns the hermeneutic  dimension of 
technological mediation. Ihde analyzes the s tructure of the relations between human beings 
and technological artifacts , and investigates  how technologies help to shape, on the basis of 
these relations, human perceptions and interpretations of reality (e .g., Ihde, 1990; 1998). A 
good example to illus trate this  hermeneutic  intentionality, which I elaborated above, is  
obstetric  ultrasound. As I showed, the technology of ultrasound does not provide a neutral 
peek into the womb but helps  to cons titute parents  and their unborn child, and the relations 
between them, in specific ways which generate moral problems and even inform the ways 
to answer them. 
In all of these examples, artifacts  are active: they help to shape human ac tions, 
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interpretations, and decisions, which would have been diffe rent without the artifac t. To be 
sure, artifac ts  do not have intentions like human beings  do, because they cannot 
deliberately do something. But their lack of consciousness does not take away the fac t that 
artifac ts  can have intentions in the lite ral sense of the Latin word ‘intendere’, which means 
‘to direc t’, ‘to direct one’s  course’, ‘to direc t one’s mind’. The intentionality of artifac ts  is  to 
be found in their direc ting role in the actions and experiences of human beings. 
Technological mediation, therefore, can be seen as a specific , material fo rm of 
intentionality. 
With regard to the second aspec t of intentionality, the ‘originality’ of intentions , a 
similar argumentation can be given. For even though artifacts  evidently cannot form 
intentions entirely on their own, again because of their lack of consciousness, their 
mediating roles cannot be entirely reduced to the intentions  of their designers  and users  
either. Otherwise, the intentionalities of artifacts would be a variant of what Searle denoted 
‘derived intentionality’ (Searle, 1983), entirely reducible to human intentionalities . Quite 
often, technologies mediate human ac tions and experiences without human beings having 
told them to do so. 
Some technologies, for instance, are used in different ways from those their 
designers  envisaged. The firs t cars , which only made 15 km/h, were used primarily for 
sport, and for medical purposes ; driving at a speed of 15 km/h was considered to c reate an 
environment of ‘thin air’, which was supposed be healthy for people with lung diseases. Only 
after cars  we re interpreted as  a means for providing long dis tance transport did the car get 
to play its  current role in the division between labor and leisure (Baudet, 1986). In this  
case, unexpec ted mediations come about in specific  use contexts . But unforeseen 
mediations can also emerge when technologies are used as intended. The very fac t that the 
introduc tion of mobile phones has led to changes in youth culture – such as  that young 
people appear to make ever less  appointments  with each other, since everyone can call and 
be called at any time and place – was  not intended by the designers  of the cell phone, even 
though it is  used here in precisely the context the designers  had envisaged. 
It seems plausible, then, to attribute a specific  form of intentionality to artifacts . This  
‘material’ form of intentionality is  quite different from human intentionality, in that it cannot 
exis t without human intentionalities  supporting it. Only within the relations between human 
beings and reality can artifacts  play their ‘intending’ mediating roles . When mediating the 
relations between humans and reality, artifac ts  help to constitute both the objec ts  in reality 
that are experienced or ac ted upon and the subjects  that are experiencing and acting. This  
implies  that the subjects  who act or make decisions about ac tions are never purely human, 
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but rather a complex blend of humanity and technology. When making a decision about 
abortion on the basis of technologically mediated knowledge about the chances that the 
child will suffer from a serious disease, this  decision is not ‘purely’ human, but neither is  it 
entirely induced by technology. The very situation of having to make this  decision and the 
very ways in which the decision is  made, are co-shaped by technological artifac ts . Without 
these technologies , either there would not be a situation of choice, or the decision would be 
made on the basis  of a different relation to the situation. At the same time, the technologies 
involved do not determine human decisions here. Moral decision-making is  a joint effort of 
human beings and technological artifacts . 
Stric tly speaking, then, there is  no such thing as ‘ technological intentionality’; 
intentionality is  always a hybrid affair, involving both human and nonhuman intentions, or, 
better, ‘composite intentions’ with intentionality dis tributed over the human and the 
nonhuman elements  in human-technology-world relationships. Rather than being ‘derived’ 
from human agents , this  intentionality comes about in associations between humans and 
nonhumans. For that reason, it could be called ‘hybrid intentionality’, or ‘dis tributed 
intentionality’. 
 
4.2 Technology and freedom 
What about the second requirement for moral agency we discerned at the beginning of this 
chapter: freedom, or even autonomy?  Now that we have concluded that a rtifac ts  may have 
some form of intentionality, can we  also say that they have freedom?  Obviously not. Again, 
freedom requires  the possession of a  mind, which artifac ts  do not have. Technologies, 
therefore, cannot be free agents  like human beings are. Nevertheless  there  are  good 
arguments  not to exclude artifac ts  entirely  from the realm of freedom that is  required for 
moral agency. In order to show this , I will firs t elaborate that human freedom in moral 
decision-making is  never absolute, but always bound to the specific  situations in which 
decisions  are  to be made, including their material infras truc ture. Second, I will  argue that in 
the human-technology associations that embody hybrid intentionality, freedom should also 
be seen as dis tributed over the human and nonhuman elements  in the associations. 
Even though freedom is obviously needed to be accountable for one’s  actions, the 
thoroughly technologically mediated charac ter of our daily lives  makes it difficult to take 
freedom as an absolute c riterion for moral agency. After all, as  became clear above, 
technologies  play an important role in virtually every moral decision we make. The decision 
how fast to drive and therefore how much risk to run of harming other people is  always 
mediated by the lay-out of the road, the power of the engine of the car, the presence or 
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absence of speed bumps and speed camera’s , et cetera. The decision to have surgery or not 
is  most often mediated by all kinds of imaging technologies , blood tes ts  et cetera, which 
help us  to constitute the body in specific  ways, thus organizing specific situations of choice. 
To be sure, moral agency does not necessarily require complete autonomy. Some 
degree of freedom can be enough to be held morally accountable for an action. And not all 
freedom is  taken away by technological mediations , as  the examples  of abortion and driving 
speed make clear. In these examples, human behavior is  not determined by technology, but 
ra ther co-shaped by it, with humans still being able to reflect on their behavior and make 
decisions about it. This  does not take away the fact, however, that most mediations, like 
those provided by speed bumps and by the presence of ultrasound scanners  as  a common 
option in medical practice, occur in a pre-reflexive manner, and can in no way be escaped in 
moral decision-making. The moral dilemmas of whether or not to have an abortion and of 
how fast to drive would not exis t in the same way without the technologies  involved in these 
prac tices , such dilemma’s are rather shaped by these technologies . Technologies  cannot be 
defined away from our daily lives. The concept of freedom presupposes a form of 
sovereignty with respect to technology that human beings simply no longer possess. 
This  conclusion can be read in two dis tinct ways. The firs t is  that mediation has 
nothing to do with morality whatsoever. If moral agency requires  freedom and technological 
mediation limits  or even annihilates  human freedom, only non-technologically mediated 
situations leave room for morality. Technological artifac ts  are unable to make moral 
decisions, and technology-induced human behavior has a non-moral character. A good 
example of this  c riticism are the commonly heard negative reactions to explicit behavior-
steering technologies like speed limiters  in cars . Usually, the resis tance against such 
technologies  is  supported by two kinds of arguments . One, there is  the fear that human 
freedom is  threatened and that democ racy is  exchanged fo r technoc racy. Should all human 
actions  be guided by technology, the c riticism goes, the outcome would be a technocratic  
society in which moral p roblems are solved by machines instead of people. Two, there is  the 
charge of immorality or, at best, amorality. Ac tions not the product of our own free will but 
induced by technology can not be described as  ‘moral’; and, what is  worse, behavior-
steering technologies might c reate a form of moral laziness  that is  fatal to the moral abilities 
of c itizens. 
These c riticisms are deeply problematic . The analyses of technological mediation 
given above show that human actions are always mediated. To phrase it in Latour’s  words : 
“Without technological detours , the properly human cannot exis t. (…) Morality is  no more 
human than technology, in the sense that it would originate from an already constitu ted 
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human who would be master of itself as  well as  of the universe. Let us say that it traverses 
the world and, like technology, that it engenders in its  wake forms of humanity, choices  of 
subjectivity, modes of objectification, various types of attachment.” (Latour, 2002). This  is  
prec isely what opponents  of speed limitation forget. Also without speed limiters , the actions  
of drivers  are continually mediated: indeed, cars can easily exceed speed limits  and because 
our roads are so wide and the bends so gentle that we can drive too fast, we are constantly 
invited to explore the space between the accelerator and the floor. Therefore, giving the 
inevitable technological mediations a desirable form rather than rejec ting outright the idea 
of a ‘moralized technology’ in fac t attes ts  to a sense of responsibility.  
The conclusion that mediation and morality are at odds  with each other, therefore, is  
not satis fying. It is  virtually impossible to think of any morally relevant situation in which 
technology does not play a role. And it would be throwing out the baby with the bathwate r 
to conclude that there is  no room for morality and moral judgments  in all situations in which 
technologies  play a role. Therefore, an alternative solution is  needed of the apparent tension 
between technological mediation and ethics . Rather than taking absolute freedom as a 
prerequisite for moral agency, we need to reinterpret freedom as an agent’s  ability to relate 
to what determines him or her. Human ac tions always take place in a s tubborn reality, and 
for this  reason, absolute freedom can only be attained by ignoring reality, and therefore by 
giving up the possibility to act at all. Freedom is not a lack of fo rces  and constraints ; it 
ra ther is  the exis tential space human beings have within which to realize their exis tence. 
Humans have a relation to their own exis tence and to the ways in which this  is  co-shaped 
by the material culture in which it takes place. The material situatedness of human 
exis tence c reates  specific  fo rms of freedom, rather than impedes them. Freedom exis ts  in 
the possibilities  that a re opened up for human beings to have a relationship with the 
environment in which they live and to which they are bound, as  I will elaborate in section 5 
This  redefinition of freedom, to be sure, s till leaves no room to actually attribute 
freedom to technological artifacts . But it does take artifac ts  back into the realm of freedom, 
ra ther than excluding them from it altogether. On the one hand, after all, they help to 
constitute freedom, by providing the material environment in which human exis tence takes 
place and takes its  form. And on the other hand, artifac ts  can enter associations with 
human beings, while these associations, consis ting partly of material artifac ts , are the 
places where freedom is  to be located. For even though freedom is  never absolute but is  
always gets  shaped by technological and contextual mediations , these very mediations also 
create the space fo r moral decision-making. Jus t like intentionality, freedom also appears  to 
be a hybrid affair, most often located in associations of humans and artifacts . 
 16
4.3 Materiality and moral agency 
This  expansion of the concepts  of intentionality and freedom might raise the ques tion if we 
really need to fiddle with such fundamental ethical concepts  to unders tand the moral 
relevance of technological artifacts . In order to show that the answer to this  question is  yes, 
we can connect to an example elaborated by Latour: the debate between the National Rifle 
Association in the USA and its  opponents . In this debate, those opposing the virtually 
unlimited availability of guns in the USA use the s logan “Guns Kill People”, while the NRA 
replies  with the slogan “Guns don’t kill people; people kill people” (Latour 1999, 176).  
The NRA position seems to be most in line with mainstream thinking about ethics. If 
someone is  shot, nobody would ever think about keeping the gun responsible for this . Yet, 
the anti-gun position evidently also has a point here: in a society without guns, fewer fights  
would result in murder. A gun is  not a mere instrument, a medium for the free will of 
human beings; it helps  to define situations and agents  by offering specific  possibilities for 
action. A gun cons titutes  the person holding the gun as  a potential gunman and his or her 
adversary as  a potential le thal vic tim. Without denying the importance of human 
responsibility in any way, this  example illus trates that when a person is  shot, agency should 
not be located exclusively in either the gun or the person shooting, but in the assembly of 
both.  
The example, therefore, illus trates  that we need to develop a new perspective of 
both concepts . It does not imply that artifacts  can ‘have’ intentionality and freedom, jus t 
like humans are supposed to have. Rather, the example shows that (1) intentionality is  
hardly ever a purely human affair, but mos t often a matter of human-technology 
associations ; and (2) freedom should not be unders tood as  the absence of ‘external’ 
influences on agents , but as  a practice of dealing with such influences or mediations.  
 
 
5. Technology and Moral Subjectivity3 
 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis above is  that ethics  is  not a solely 
human affair, but a matter of associations between humans and technologies. This  implies  
that the ethics  of technology cannot depart from a separation between humans and 
technology, which charac terizes  so many ethical approaches. This  separation, fo r ins tance, 
hides behind precautionary approaches which aim to pull the emergency brake when a 
specific  technological development would be a threat to society. And it hides behind 
approaches that aim to find the most p rudent and jus t way to deal with the risks that are 
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connected to the introduction of a new technology. In these approaches, humans are placed 
on the one side of a line, technologies on the other side, and humans have the task to see 
to it that technologies do not c ross  the line too far and start to interfere in the human world 
in undesirable ways . This  scheme is at the roots of many moral frameworks which are s till 
influential, like Habermas’s lifeworld–sys tem model (Habermas 1984) and Heidegger’s  plea 
for an attitude of “releasement” in dealing with technology (Heidegger 1969), aiming to use 
technology only when it is  unavoidable, without letting ourselves be dete rmined by it. 
     Positions like these perfec tly see that very close relations can exis t between humans and 
technologies–contrary to the at least equally influential position of ins trumentalism which 
(wrongly) holds  that technology is  primarily an instrument which can be used for good and 
bad purposes and in good or bad ways, without being good or bad in itself. Yet, the 
technophobia which is  implicit in it, to use a concept of Gilbert Hottois  (Hottois  1996) has 
counterproductive effec ts . Rather than taking the interwoven character of the human and 
the technological as  a point of departure for ethical reflection, the technological is  taken as  
a threat, which needs to be kept away from the human with the help of ethics. 
     Simple examples  can make visible the failure of this  reasoning. Gerard de Vries , for 
example, showed how the moral evaluation of anesthesia has changed dras tically over time 
(De Vries  1993). While the application of anesthesia was initially condemned severely, on 
various moral and theological grounds, nowadays it would be highly immoral to perform 
surgery without anesthesia. Seen from the pas t, the c ritics of those times would probably 
interpret this  development as  the results  of entering a slippery slope, but from the 
perspective of the present it becomes clear that ethics  is  a dynamic  phenomenon, which 
develops in interaction with technology. 
 
5.1 Ethics  and Moral Self–Cons titution 
The late work of M ichel Foucault opens a perspective on ethics  which offers  room to do 
jus tice to this  relation between ethics  and technological developments, and to the 
technologically mediated charac ter of moral action. In the las t two volumes of his  His tory of 
Sexuality he elaborates  an approach to ethics  which differs  radically from the prevailing 
ethical frameworks  (Foucault 1984a, 1984b). For Foucault, ethics  is  not primarily about the 
question which imperatives  we need to follow, but about the ways in which human beings 
constitute themselves as  “subjects ” of a moral code. And ra ther than aiming to develop a 
new code himself, Foucault investigates  what these codes “do” to people and how humans 
“subject” themselves to it. 
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     In order to achieve this , Foucault connects  to ethical approaches from classical antiquity, 
in which ethics was explicitly directed at “developing a self”; at constituting oneself as  a 
specific  subject. The word “subject” perfec tly brings to expression that ethics  is  not only a 
matter of a person who is  the “subject” of his  or her life–like the “subject” of a sentence–
but that this  person also “subjects ” him– or herself to a specific  moral code–a specific vision 
of what constitutes a good life and a good person. In this  very “subjec tion”, Foucault locates 
ethics . Moral “subjection” has already taken many forms, like the Kantian subjec t that 
wants  to keep its  intentions pure and assesses them in terms of their potential to function 
as universal laws ; or the utilitarian subject that aims to examine the consequences of i ts  
actions  in order to attain a prevalence of positive outcomes over negative outcomes. The 
most important characteris tic  of classical ethical frameworks, however, is  that they show 
that in ethics not only the moral rightness of our ac tions is  at s take, but also our moral 
subjectivity. For the constitution of subjectivity did not take place implicitly then, but in an 
explicit way. 
     Foucault’s  investigation of classical e thics primarily concerns the ethics  in dealing with 
sexuality. He convincingly shows that in classical Antiquity, sexuality was not organized via 
a moral code of imperatives  and prohibitions , but primarily in terms of s tyling. Ethics  
consis ted in finding such a relationship to one’s  sexual passions and drives that they do not 
determine the self but become the object of ac tive s tyling in the form of “self practices ”. 
Rather than letting the subjec t take shape implicitly, e.g. by subordinating its  passions to 
Chris tian sexual morality , or by subordinating its intentions  to a Kantian categorical 
imperative, in classical Antiquity subject constitution took place explicitly, in a variety of 
ascetic  and aesthetic  prac tices . The purpose of these prac tices  was  not to subordinate the 
passions to a code, but to s tylize one’s  sexual behavior. Or, put more broadly: ethics was 
not about showing the morally right behavior, but about living a good life. Foucault 
indicated these practices of moral selfconstitution as “techniques of the self” or “p rac tices of 
the self”: the explicit s tyling, prac ticing and shaping of oneself into a specific  moral 
individual.  
     This  does not imply that Foucault wanted to return to the specific  subject of classical 
antiquity. But he did want to return to the way in which that subject came into being: the 
explicit shaping of one’s  subjec tivity by deliberately “subjecting” oneself to a specific  code 
and specific  moral prac tices . In fact, Foucault’s  approach implies that any form of e thics  is  
based on a specific  form of “subjection”–even modern ethical systems like Kantian 
deontology and utilitarian consequentialism. Any ethical system, after all, not only defines a 
code of behavior but also a subjec t that is  supposed to follow this  code. Also following the 
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Kantian categorical imperative or ac ting such that desirable consequences prevail over 
undesirable consequences are ways to cons titute oneself as  a moral subjec t. 
 
5.2 Ethics  of Technology and the Moral Subjec t 
This  approach to ethics  in terms of moral self–constitution has particular relevance fo r the 
ethics  of technology. Foucault’s  ethical perspective unites  two aspects  that usually remain 
opposites in ethics : the radically mediated character of the subject on the one hand, which 
causes the subjec t to lose the autonomy it used to have ever s ince the Enlightenment; and 
the ability of the subject to relate itself to what mediates the subject on the other hand, 
which enables the subject to actively help to shape these mediations . Jus t like the ancient 
Greek and Romans did not deny or suppress  the sexual passions, but rather acknowledged 
and actively helped to shape them, we can develop a relation to what appears  to dete rmine 
us by actively shaping these “determinants ”. And in our times, technology is  a p re–eminent 
example of these determinants–without, to be sure, aiming to downplay the important role 
of sexuality in our culture. 
     If technology fundamentally mediates  what kind of humans we are, by shaping our 
actions  and experiences, and even our moral decisions, this  does not yet imply that 
“humanity” is  mastered by “technology” o r that “the system” has entered “the lifeworld” 
and causes humans not to be treated as  subjects but as  objec ts , as  some Heideggerian and 
Habermasian positions want us  to believe. F rom a Foucauldian perspective, the 
technologically mediated charac ter of life in a technological culture does not need to be seen 
as a threat to the subject but rather fo rms a specific  way in which the subjec t is  constituted. 
This  technologically mediated constitution of the subjec t, then, is  not merely a s tate of 
affairs  we s imply have to accept; i t rather is  the s tarting point fo r moral self–prac tices  (c f. 
Dorres tijn 2004, 89–104). 
     By acknowledging the inevitability of the mediated character of human subjec tivity, and 
the fact that technology is  one of the sources of mediation, it becomes possible to connect 
ethics  with the phenomenon of technological mediation. Ethics  then does not merely come 
down to protecting “humanity” against “technology”, but consis ts  in carefully assessing and 
experimenting with technological mediations, in order to explicitly shape the way in which 
we are subjec ts  in our technological culture. 
     Connecting again to the example of ultrasound can clarify what such experiments  can 
entail. As  we saw, ultrasound substantially contributes  to the experience of expecting a 
child, by framing pregnancy in medical terms , and confronting expecting parents  with a 
dilemma if their unborn appears  to have a significant risk of a serious disease. F rom a moral 
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point of view, this  role of ultrasound imaging is  at least as important as , e.g., the possible 
health risk for the fe tus caused by ultrasonic  sound waves, which would be the natural focus 
of many ethical approaches to technology. This  is especially true when taking into account 
that such dilemmas have a tragic  dimension. As explained above, the risk–es timation 
offered by ultrasound can only be converted into certainty by having an amniocentesis  
done, which has a risk of provoking a miscarriage–and in many cases this  risk is  higher than 
the risk to have a child suffering from Down’s  syndrome. Having antenatal ultrasound 
examinations done, therefore, inevitably implies the choice for a specific  kind of subjectivity, 
in which humans are constituted as  subjec ts  that have to make decisions about the life of 
their unborn child, and in which obtaining certainty about the health condition of an unborn 
child is  worth the price of losing healthy unborn child as a result of the required test.  
     When this  specific  form of subject constitution becomes subject of moral re flection, we 
gain the space to explicitly relate ourselves to it. By deliberately dealing with ultrasound 
imaging, after all, this  subject cons titution can be modified, changed, and re fined. For 
ins tance, by only using ultrasound to determine the expected date of birth, without wanting 
to have further information about nuchal translucency or neural tube defec ts . Or by only 
using antenatal examinations  to estimate a risk, in order to be prepared for the possible 
birth of a child with health problems, without exposing oneself to the risks  of having an 
amniocentesis  done. Or by actually having all tests done, as  an explicit choice rather than 
an unintended side–effect of the normative wo rkings that are hidden behind offering such 
diagnos tic  tests  at a large scale. Or by refusing ultrasound examinations at all (c f. Rapp 
1998). 
     This  explicit relation to the mediating role of technology embodies a form of freedom 
that is  an interesting alternative to autonomy. Recognizing that our experiences and actions  
are inevitably mediated by technology, the choice is here to explicitly “shape” and “s tylize” 
these mediations, in order to help to shape one’s own subjec tivity. Freedom here is  not the 
absence of factors  that s teer and shape the subject, but the very relation to these factors . 
Our exis tence, after all, takes place in an environment that shows resis tance; without this  
resis tance we simply could not exis t. F reedom is a practice that is  co–organized by the 
technological infras truc ture of our exis tence, and which forms the basis for the shape our 
subjectivity takes. The subject, in Foucault’s  words , is  a form  that always needs to get 
shape in conc rete “self prac tices ” (O’Leary 2002, 2–3). 
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5.3 Technologically Mediated Subject Cons titution 
Foucault does not directly relate his  analysis  of subjec t constitution to technology. Yet, in 
view of his  ethics  of moral subjectivity, the technologically mediated cons titution of the 
moral subject, deserves a central place in the ethics  of technology. In this  section, I will 
further elaborate how Foucault’s  e thical work and the postphenomenological analysis  of 
technological mediation can be integrated to accomplish this .  
     Foucault discerns four aspects  of moral self–constitution: the ethical substance which is  
the object of e thical work ; the mode of subjec tion that is  applied; the self practices  in which 
the ethical substance gets  shape; and the teleology of these prac tices , which consis ts  in the 
way of exis ting we aspire to by ac ting in a moral way. Connecting these four aspects  of 
moral self–cons titution to the ways in which technologies  help to shape the subjec t makes it 
possible to open an ethical perspective of technology in which the interwoven character of 
humans and technology is  be the s tarting point of e thical re flection. 
     The ethical substance concerns  what people in a specific  his torical period take as  the 
“material” of e thical self–work; the point of application for subjec tivation. This  can be the 
intentions behind our ac tions, as  elaborated in the work of Kant, but also the passions , 
which have been, for instance, the objec t of Chris tian morality and of classical Greek ethics  
(Foucault 1997, 263). In the ethical perspec tive opened by Foucault himself, the material 
for ethics is the “subject form” in a more general sense: the subjec t taken purely as  a form 
that receives content by being “subject–ed” in a specific  way. For a Foucauldian perspective 
of technology, this  subjec t form is  the ethical substance: the subjectivity that is  getting 
shape in interac tion with both technology and with our own ways of dealing with these 
technological mediations. The human subjec t is  constituted in a complex interplay of 
mediating technology, the reality to which it relates  itself, and the way in which it relates  
itself to its  own subjec tivity and to the ways in which it is  technologically mediated. 
     For Foucault, the mode of subjec tion is  the way in which people are invited or s timulated 
to recognize a specific  code as  a morally obliging. This  can be a divine law which is  revealed 
in a book, a cosmic  order of natural laws, or a universal and rational rule (Foucault 1997, 
264). In our technological culture, this  mode of subjection in many cases exis ts  in the 
phenomenon of technological mediation itself. The ways in which technologies  help to shape 
our actions and the inte rpretations on the basis  of which we make decisions, after all, 
determine to a high degree what can be recognized as  a moral obligation, what moral 
problems are morally relevant, and what persons have specific  moral responsibilities . 
Technologies shape us as  spec ific  moral subjects–like ultrasound constitutes  expecting 
parents  as subjects  that have to make a decision regarding the life of their unborn, and 
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makes it possible to prevent the birth of children with serious  diseases. Not only the 
religious frameworks , views of life, and philosophical systems that were handed down to us  
impose moral tasks and obligations upon us, but so do technological artifacts . 
     Subsequently, self practices in a technological culture consis t in deliberately dealing with 
this  phenomenon of technological mediation, in order to help shape the ways in which 
technologies  are used and impact our daily lives. Foucault indicates the “self–forming 
activities ” of self practices  as “ascetism”: a form of ascesis , defined broadly, in which human 
beings take a dis tance from what determines them. This  ascesis  does not necessarily exis t 
in radically abandoning things , like comfort, sex, or specific  kinds of food, to mention some 
ascetic  examples  from the past. What is  c rucial here for Foucault, is  the dis tance which 
makes that the subject is  not s imply handed over to the powers  that aim to shape it, but 
explicitly takes a s tance toward these powers–not denying their important role in subjec t 
constitution, but ac tively accompanying and reshaping this  role. 
     In our culture, technology is  one of the mos t important powers  that help shape 
subjectivity. Ascesis  in a technological culture, therefore, primarily means : deliberately 
using technology by anticipating and modifying its  mediating role in our exis tence, realizing 
that each use prac tice helps  to shape one’s  subjectivity. It does not imply, therefore, that 
one should refrain from technology, and only use it reluctantly when it is  unavoidable, as  
embodied in Heidegger’s  attitude of “releasement” (Gelassenheit). Technological ascesis , to 
the contrary, consis ts  in using technology, but in a deliberate and responsible way, such 
that the “self” that results  from it–including its  relations to other people–acquires  a 
desirable shape. Not the moral acceptability, then, is  central in ethical re flec tion on 
technology use, but the quality of the prac tices that result from it, and the subjec ts  that are 
constituted in it. 
     Teleology, to conclude, for Foucault is  about the ques tion what kind of beings we aspire 
to be when we behave morally. What do we aim at when we literally “subject” ourselves to 
a specific  moral code–what kind of subjects  do we want to be?  In Foucault’s  words, 
regarding the ethical systems from the pas t: “Do we want to become pure, o r immortal, of 
free, or masters  over ourselves?” (Foucault 1997, 265). Given the technologically mediated 
character of subjec tivity, answering the ques tion what kind of subjects  we want to be is  one 
of the major challenges of our technological culture. Integrating Foucault’s  analysis of moral 
subject constitution and the postphenomenological analysis of technological mediation, a 
teleological perspective in our technological culture should address  the question of how to 
shape our selves in dealing with technology: what kind of mediated subjec ts  do we want to 
be? Rather than separating the human domain from the domain of technology, we need to 
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ask ourselves in what ways we want both domains to interfere. Their interwoven character 
is  unavoidable–and therefore ethics  should not try  to save humanity from technology, but to 
let both domains interfere in desirable ways.  
     For answering the ques tion of what kind of mediated subjec ts  we want to be, to be sure, 
the ethical frameworks from classical virtue ethics and modern deontological and utilitarian 
systems can continue to play an important role. Foucault’s  thesis that all e thical systems 
eventually embody a specific form of subject constitution, after all, does not take away the 
fact that the frameworks that were handed down to us  from the past can s till prove to be 
valuable for dealing with the technological mediation of our subjectivity and with the 
question of what kind of subjects  we want to be. Moral self–practices  in a technological 
culture, in which human beings attempt to give a des irable shape to the technological 
mediation of their subjec tivity, offer plenty of space for the virtue ethical pursuit of the good 
life, the deontological ambition to meet moral norms, and the utilitarian goal to reach a 
preponderance of positive effec ts  over negative effects . 
     Regarding the case of obstetric  ultrasound, parents  can fo r ins tance choose to have their 
unborn child screened for diseases because the birth of a child with a serious disease can 
have very negative effects  on the other children in the family. They can also refuse 
ultrasound sc reening, fo r instance on the basis of the norm that unborn life may not be 
terminated, or from the desire not to be brought in a position of having to make a decision 
about the life of one’s unborn child. In all of these cases, there is  a deliberate shaping of the 
ways in which humans are being constituted as  a moral subject, from the realization that 
technology plays a mediating role here too. Human beings are not fully autonomous in their 
subject constitution; they have to accept both the pregnancy and the possibility to have 
ultrasound sc reening done as  a given fac t. But they do have the freedom to let themselves 
be cons tituted as  a specific  subject–a subject that will have to decide about the life of its  
unborn child; a subject that orients  itself on norms which exis t separately from the situation 
in which they need to be applied; or a subject that wants  to use the availability of a 
technological fo rm of contact with unborn life for a careful assessment of all possible 
consequences of letting or letting a child be born with a serious disease. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In  our technological culture, it is  of vital importance not to consider technology and morality 
as two separate phenomena located in two separate domains. Technologies  play a 
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fundamentally mediating role in human prac tices and experiences, and fo r this  reason it can 
be argued that moral agency is dis tributed over both humans and technological artifacts . 
This  technologically mediated charac ter of moral agency deserves a central place in the 
ethics  of technology. Rather than focus ing mainly on the early detection and jus t 
dis tribution of risks , the ethics  of technology should also address  the phenomenon of 
technological mediation.  
     One of the most important ways to do this , besides analyzing the moral role of artifac ts , 
is  to address  the role technology plays in the ways human beings are cons tituted as  moral 
subjects . This  can be done by connecting the postphenomenological approach of 
technological mediation to Foucault’s  ethical perspective. Such a connec tion enables  the 
ethics  of technology to address  the quality of the technological mediations of moral 
decisions. This  can be done by enabling designers  to ac tively anticipate the morally relevant 
role of technology. But it can also be done by developing a specific  attitude to technology in 
which the technological constitution of moral subjectivity is  explicitly reflected upon and 
actively reshaped. Only by explicitly addressing how technologies  help to constitute humans 
as moral subjects , the ethics  of technology can do jus tice to both the moral character of 
technology and the technological character of morality. 
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1 Thi s secti on i s based on a secti on of my chapt er for the book Phil osophy and Desi gn: From 
Engi neeri ng to Archi tect ure (eds. Pi eter E. Vermaas, Peter Kroes, Andrew Li ght, and Steven A. Moore, 
f orthcomi ng with Spri nger, Dordrecht)  
2 For ot her anal yses of the moral  rel evance of technol ogi cal  artifacts, see Borgmann (1995) and 
Acht erhui s (1995). 
3 Parts of thi s secti on are based on fragments from a secti on of my arti cl e ‘ Et hi ek en technol ogi e: 
moreel  act orschap en subj ecti vi tei t i n een technol ogi sche cultuur’ (Ethi sche Perspecti even 16:3, Sept. 
2006, pp. 267-289). 
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